Periods
Ending 2/29/08
|
Eli
Lilly & Co (LLY)
|
S&P
500 Index
|
LLY
Relative to S&P 500 Index
|
S&P
500 Health Care Index
|
LLY
Relative to S&P 500 Health Care Index
|
10
years
|
-6.49%
|
48.95%
|
-55.44%
|
49.21%
|
-55.70%
|
5
years
|
1.16%
|
73.31%
|
-72.15%
|
36.67%
|
-35.51%
|
3
years
|
-2.24%
|
16.99%
|
-19.23%
|
14.44%
|
-16.68%
|
•
|
Generated an
absolute total stock return of -6.46% over the last ten
years.
|
•
|
Underperformed
both the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 500 Health Care Index over the
three, five and ten year time periods ending February 29,
2008.
|
•
|
Shareowners
do not have the right to amend the company’s bylaws. Approximately 95% of
companies in the S&P 500 and the Russell 1000 allow shareowners this
right.
|
•
|
Shareowners
do not have the right to call special meetings, remove directors without
cause, or fill board
vacancies.
|
•
|
Even on
actions for which shareowners do have voting rights, many voting items
would require an 80% supermajority vote such as approving mergers or
business combinations (without board approval). The effect of this was
evident at the 2007 annual meeting, when a management supported proposal
to declassify the board failed after receiving support from 75% of the
outstanding shares.
|
•
|
Send a
powerful message by voting FOR proposal # 7 on Eli Lilly’s proxy
card
|
•
|
Furthermore,
we ask our fellow investors to publicize their vote to further unite and
encourage investors to support this campaign.
|
•
|
Do not be
misled. If you are a large holder and find yourself under pressure from
Eli Lilly management to vote against our proposal, ask yourself why
defeating this initiative – which is intended to improve board
accountability, shareowner rights, and shareowner value – is so important
to them.
|